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In this paper we analyse the technological activities of EU regions to assess the degree 
of technological concentration and asymmetries in the EU area and the role of the EC 
Programme for research and innovation - Horizon 2020 - at reducing or amplifying 
regional asymmetries. Technological capabilities are very unevenly distributed in the 
EU, and spatial concentration is much higher than that of GDP. Over the period 
examined (2001-16) some technological convergence of the most peripheral and least 
innovative regions of Europe has occurred even if it has been slow, involving almost 
exclusively the Eastern EU regions. Horizon 2020 seems to favour the integration of 
regions from peripherical countries. However, the focus on scientific excellence, 
particularly of the European Research Council, may instead contribute to exacerbate 
the technological gaps across EU regions. Our results suggest there is a trade-off 
between inclusion and excellence when designing research and innovation policies. 
This finding will help to inform policy makers and policy analysts in implementing 
the Horizon Europe scheme (2021-2027). 
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Introduction: The distribution of technological competences in 
Europe as a challenge for EU policies.  
In the latest two decades, the European economic and technological landscape has 
experienced profound transformations accompanied by centripetal and centrifugal 
forces. On the one hand, centripetal forces are driven by agglomeration economies 
and the increasing role of technological leaders in shaping the spatial distribution of 
innovative activities in the EU area (Iammarino et al., 2019). On the other hand, deep 
changes have occurred in the EU production and technological landscape, with new 
regional players emerging as a result of the enlargement (toward East) of the EU, the 
new opportunities for firms located in Eastern regions to be integrated within 
continental and global value chains, and the propensity to marginalize firms and 
regions located in southern countries (Stöllinger, 2016, Celi et al., 2018). 
Public policies are likely to contribute to either centripetal or centrifugal processes. 
On the one hand, competitive science and technology (S&T) EU schemes may end up 
favouring leading players and regions since they aim to strength the role of EU 
innovation system in the global arena. On the other hand, cohesion policies aim at 
reducing the regional gaps across European territories, which in turn can also be 
favoured by the collaborative setting of part of the S&T policies aiming at the creation 
of an integrated European research area. 
It is a typical case in which public policies may lead to contrasting directions. Policies 
that ex-post provide opposite outcomes might still be valuable, provided they are 
informed by an overall common strategy. Unfortunately, the empirical evidence on 
the role played by EU policies in favouring technological convergence, or 
alternatively technological polarization is still limited.  
The aim of this paper is to start filling this gap by investigating the dynamics of 
technological activities of EU regions and getting preliminary evidence on the role 
played by the main EU Science and Technology policy scheme, i.e. H2020, in 
reducing or amplifying regional asymmetries. The results will complement those of 
studies focusing on cohesion policies, which have shown that positive effects on 
regional growth may be hampered by an unfavourable industrial structure, the lack of 
R&D capabilities in the receiving regions (Cappellen et al., 2003) as well as the poor 
administrative and political governance factors needed to take advantage of the 
availability of structural and cohesion funds (Incaltarau et al., 2019).  
Specifically, this study aims at:  
a) measuring the degree of technological polarization in the EU at a regional 
(NUTS2) level and its dynamics;  
b) understanding to what extent the current and potential distribution of technological 
capabilities in EU regions is associated to national- or regional-specific factors. This, 
in turn, will help to understand when there are suitable conditions to allow an upgrade 
of backward regions; 
c) analysing the regional distribution of the resources provided by the European 
Commission’s Horizon 2020 Programme (H2020) – the EU’s flagship instrument for 
science and technology policy – to assess their potential impact on regional 
convergence/divergence, providing evidence on whether the H2020 reinforces 
processes of technological concentration or is coherent with the objectives of EU 
cohesion policies.  
While we are aware of the limited resources provided by EC Framework Programs 
(FPs) compared to those mobilized by other EU policies (i.e. cohesion funds), by 
national policies as well as by the business sector, we will argue that they are strategic 
and can have an impact possibly higher than the actual financial budget available. 
The technological activities of EU regions will be analysed using REGPAT, a fresh 
patent database developed by the OECD allocating patents filed at the European 
Patent Office (EPO) to regions according to the addresses of inventors as reported in 
the patent documents; the analysis will cover a period of at least 15 years, up to 2016. 
The regional distribution of H2020 funds will be analysed using data provided by the 
Community Research and Development Information Service (CORDIS) of the 
European Union. The use of H2020 data present two advantages with respect to 
previous data on the EU FPs: i) it provides for the first time a breakdown of budget 
allocation at the level of project partners (previously the whole budget was allocated 
to the project coordinator) (e.g. Amoroso et al., 2018), and; ii) it allows to assess the 
relevance and potential impact of very different types of S&T policy schemes 
included in H2020, and in particular the role of the European Research Council 
(ERC), which represents an innovation in the traditional S&T EU policy framework. 
In fact, ERC is explicitly focused on the support of frontier research and excellence, 
in so doing abandoning the idea of research consortia and networks that traditionally 
characterized the previous EC FPs. We are here considering for the first time ERC, as 
part of H2020, also for his impact on regional cohesion.  
Key issues addressed in this paper are the following: are laggard and peripheral EU 
regions catching-up with regard to the core and more advanced EU technological 
areas? Do clear macro-regional patterns emerge? Does the EU science and technology 
policy foster processes of technological concentration or is it coherent with the 
objectives set by EU cohesion policy? Do the different funding schemes show traces 
of possible heterogeneous effects? 
The study is structured as follows. Section 2 defines the policy context in which this 
study is positioned and provides a survey of the relevant literature. Section 3 contains 
a brief description regarding the dataset used and the methodology used. Section 4 
contains a descriptive analysis of the level and dynamics of technological 
concentration of technological activities in the EU area at a regional level, on the 
technological fields where technological polarization is higher and those where the 
innovation capabilities are more evenly distributed. Section 5 provides a descriptive 
analysis of the main geographical and macro-regional patterns of the distribution of 
patent activities in the EU area and the extent to which such patterns have changed 
over time. Section 6 assesses the potential impact on regional convergence/divergence 
of H2020. Section 7 concludes with some policy implications. 
 
Policy context and relevant literature 
Building a cohesive and competitive European Union has represented for several 
decades one of the most challenging and ambitious goal of our continental policy 
institutions, and one which is still far from being reached. Since the release of the 
Lisbon Strategy in 2000, fostering science, technology, innovation and human capital 
have been considered key ingredients and leverages of any strategy pursuing such a 
goal (Archibugi and Lundvall, 2002; Lorenz and Lundvall, 2006). Regions, rather 
than countries, have progressively increased their relevance as key spatial and socio-
economic units as well as policy targets of cohesion policies (European Commission, 
2010, 2011a; Boschma and Frenken, 2011). In the most recent years, regional 
innovation strategies for smart specialization (RIS3) have become a key component of 
the EU Cohesion Policy 2014-2020, supporting the thematic concentration of 
available resources and reinforcing the strategic programming and performance 
orientation policy action (European Commission, 2011a, 2014a).  
More precisely, the RIS3 initiative encourages regions and cities from different EU 
Member States to strengthen their technological bases and to collaborate and learn 
from each other through joint programmes, projects and networks with concrete 
impacts on every aspect of economic life including innovation, accessibility, 
education, business, employment and the environment. In this context, regions should 
be outward looking to be able to map and identify their strengths and weaknesses, 
position themselves in the European and global value chains, and, at the same time, 
improve their connections and cooperation with other regions, clusters and innovation 
players. This is deemed to be of crucial importance to favour the internationalisation 
of their companies, to achieve a critical potential of cluster activities and to generate 
inflows of knowledge relevant to the region’s existing knowledge base. 
The starting point is that, as shown and empirically documented by numerous 
contributions, technological capacities are far from being evenly distributed across 
industries, firms and even more at a spatial level (Meliciani, 2015). This is due to 
various factors, the most important being the cumulative nature of innovation and 
learning processes, the localized character of spillovers, externalities and systemic 
interactions in the process of generation and economic exploitation of technology 
(Evangelista et al., 2002). Furthermore, geographical, technological and 
institutional proximity is crucial for regional economic development and this 
contributes to accelerate and strengthen the processes of agglomeration and 
clustering (Von Lynker and Thoennessen, 2017). These features produce long-
lasting spatial technological asymmetries that can, in absence of corrective 
mechanisms, produce not-reversible processes of polarization, leaving several 
regions in their technological backwardness. 
 
Systematic and up-dated analyses on the level and dynamics of technological 
polarization in the EU area are still limited and even more so the studies looking at 
this issue from a regional perspective. Paci and Usai (2000), analysing main 
regional differences in a restricted number of EU countries in (labour) productivity 
and technological intensity (measured through patents per employee), have found a 
high level of regional technological concentration, although in presence of a 
declining trend in the regional dispersion of innovative activity over the 1980-90 
decade, mainly due to changes in the distribution of technological capacities 
between Southern and Northern Europe.  
Significantly, the dispersion of labour productivity is remarkably lower than that of 
innovative activities. While there is some convergence at the country level, this 
does not emerge at regional level. Moreno et al. (2006), looking at the 1994–1996 
and 1999–2001 periods, have shown that innovations have been spreading to more 
regions in Southern Europe (Spain and the South of Italy especially) and in the 
Scandinavian countries but also that this process has not been homogenous across 
European regions and countries. Archibugi and Filippetti (2011) have shown that 
the 2008 financial crisis halted the convergence process across countries in 
innovation. A more recent study (Evangelista et al. 2016) has shown that the 
distribution of technological capabilities in EU regions is much more concentrated 
than that of gross domestic product (GDP). Dopke et al. (2017), on the basis of  a 
set of regional quality‐of‐life indicators have shown that in the case of the EU 
regional inequality in “well-being” is lower than regional inequality in real GDP 
per capita (Incaltarau et al., 2019). 
The spatially uneven distribution of technological activities and competences has 
also a sectoral dimension, with some sectors and technological fields more 
concentrated than others (Breschi 2000, Paci and Usai 2000, Moreno et al. 2006, 
Usai 2008). According to Paci and Usai (2000) spatial dependence in technological 
activities and performances is a phenomenon affecting all sectors but there are 
spatial and sectoral specificities which generates different types of specialized 
clusters across EU regions. In some sectors, technological competencies are highly 
spatially concentrated in all countries even when the spatial distribution of 
industrial activities is more irregular. Evangelista et al. (2018) find a high level of 
spatial concentration for the most promising technological field: fast growing 
technological fields (FGTs) and the so-called Key Enabling Technologies (KETs). 
KETs are highly concentrated in Central Europe while FGTs prevail in 
Scandinavian countries and in the UK. The study also shows the presence of some 
conditional convergence in KETs and, to a less extent, in FGTs. 
There is a wealth of exercises which have tried to profile EU regions on a variety 
of indicators of technological capabilities (Navarro et al., 2009; Verspagen, 2010; 
Wintjes and Hollanders, 2011). The most recent regional taxonomic exercise is the 
one proposed by the European Commission (2014b) and identifying four main 
regional innovation groups: Leaders, Followers, Moderate, and Modest 
Innovators. 1  These geographical patterns are in turn quite like those emerging 
when considering only the patenting activities of regions (Paci and Usai, 2000; 
Vezzani et al., 2018). 
 
Regional taxonomies using multiple indicators represent a useful tool for mapping 
- at a pure descriptive level - the technological profile of EU regions. They are 
nonetheless less effective in assessing and monitoring the level and dynamics of 
technological polarization, which is the first topic investigated in this contribution. 
Furthermore, in these types of taxonomic exercises, as well as in most of the 
existing literature on the EU-regional technological landscape, the role played by 
EU S&T policies in influencing the profiles of the different regional groups as well 
as the dynamics of technological gaps has remained neglected. There are few 
exceptions: one is the micro-level study by Loredana Fattorini, Ghodsi and Rungi 
(2019) that finds that the European regional development fund supporting direct 
investments in R&D at regional level is associated with the improvement of firms' 
productivity while funding designed to support overall business is not; another one 
is the work by Muscio and Ciffolilli (2020) which uses regional data from the 7th 
European Framework Programme to investigate the factors underlying the capacity 
to participate to Industry 4.0 related projects. Their results suggest that regional 
economic competitiveness matters and that network participation is particularly 
relevant for less developed regions.  
 
As a matter of fact, most of the literature on the EU Framework Programmes 
leverage the collaborative design of these funds to explore the effectiveness of EU 
network policies (Breschi and Cusumano, 2004), their success in favouring 
interdisciplinary research (Bruce et al., 2004), the role of collaborative network 
properties in generating and diffusing knowledge (Breschi et al., 2009), or the 
factors leading to regional R&D collaborations (Amoroso et al., 2018). All-in-all, 
these studies suggest that EU policies may have favoured the integration of the 
European research around poles of highly connected actors (places), but it may 
have been less successful in integrating some research areas, such as natural and 
social sciences. In addition, while network participation may depend on regional 
capabilities, its beneficial effect seems to be relevant particularly for less endowed 
regions.  
 
Following up this last stream of literature, a second objective of this contribution 
consists of providing further fresh evidence on the effects of EU science and 
technology policy on the level of EU internal integration looking at the potential 
role played by the H2020 programme also considering the specificities of different 
pillars and actions contained in such ambitious policy scheme.  
 
Data and Methodology 
The technological activities of EU regions will be analysed using REGPAT, a 
patent database developed by the OECD where patents are linked to regions 
according to the home addresses of the inventors, allowing to identify the location 
 
1 In its latest version (Hollander et al., 2020) differences have been nuanced to assign regions to 12 
groups, from Modest- to Leader+. 
of inventive activities. We will focus on the inventor localization to analyse the 
technological capabilities of European regions since this help identifying the area 
where technological activities are carried out and knowledge and competences 
accumulated. We will use the concordance between International Patent 
Classification (IPC)2 and technologies, originally developed by Ulrich Schmoch 
(WIPO, 2013). 
 
Although in principle REGPAT provides patent information at the NUTS3 spatial 
level, the analysis will be carried out manly at the NUTS2 (and NUTS1 for some 
regions) level since for a few small countries the regional breakdown at NUTS2 
level is not available, either in REGPAT and in for most economic variables 
provided by Eurostat. Indeed, for some very small countries NUTS1 regions 
coincide with the entire nation.3 
 
For patent activities of EU regions, the analysis focuses on the 2001-2016 period 
and, as usual when working at the regional level, data are aggregated on four sub-
periods: 2001-04; 2005-08; 2009-12; 2003-16. This choice also allows us to reduce 
to the minimum the annual variability of the underlying data (particularly strong 
for patent data in the smallest unit of analysis) and to better describe the overall 
changes occurred during the period considered. 
 
We will analyse the regional distribution of H2020 funds using data provided by 
the Community Research and Development Information Service (CORDIS) of the 
European Union. This is the primary information source for projects funded by the 
EU's framework programs for research and innovation (FP1 to Horizon 2020). For 
the first time, the Horizon 2020 data provide information on the budgetary 
allocation of funds among different partners of a project. We exploit this 
information to allocate funding across the EU territories and have more detailed 
information than the counting of projects allowed by previous FPs.  
 
Consistently with other works and for presentation purposes, in sections 4 and 5 a 
series of statistics will be presented aggregating data at the level of macro regional 
groups: North Europe (Sweden, Norway, Finland and Denmark), Central Europe 
(Austria, Belgium, Germany, France, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, UK), 
South Europe (Greece, Italy, Malta, Portugal, Spain) and East Europe (Bulgaria, 
Czech Republic, Croatia, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, 
Slovenia). In section 6 we will link past technological capabilities of regions 
(2010-14) to the H2020 funds received between 2015 and 2019. By doing so we 
will assess to what extent and how the distribution of (access to) funds across 
regions is dependent on the different technological capabilities of regions, possibly 




2 The International Patent Classification (IPC), established by the Strasbourg Agreement 1971, provides for a 
hierarchical system of language independent symbols for the classification of patents and utility models 
according to the different areas of technology to which they pertain. 
3 In particular, these countries are Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, and Malta. 
Technological concentration in the EU. A regional analysis 
In this section we investigate the level and dynamics of technological polarization 
in the EU area from a regional-distributional perspective. We use for this purpose 
the Gini coefficient, an indicator commonly used to synthesize the level of 
“concentration” and “inequality” of socio-economic phenomena and variables. 
This index has been computed on the distribution of patent applications across the 
281 EU NUTS2 regions and covering the period 2001-2016. 
 
Table 1 shows for four distinct sub-periods (2001-04; 2005-08; 2009-12; 2003-16), 
some indicators of technological and GDP concentration. GDP can be used as a 
sort of benchmark to compare the relevance and dynamics of technological 
polarization in the EU area.  The first part of Table 1 shows the Gini coefficients 
for technology and GDP, indicating that the EU area is characterized by a strong 
spatially uneven distribution of technological capacities, which in all periods is 
higher than that of GDP. Over time, there is a small centrifugal effect leading to a 
slightly decrease in technological inequality, which however remain marginal. The 
table also reports the subdivision for five broad technological areas (Electrical 
engineering; Instruments; Chemistry; Mechanical engineering; Other technological 
fields), showing that the highest level of technological concentration is found in 
ICT and Electrical Engineering technologies.  
The second part of Table 1 reports the concentration of technological activities and 
GDP in the top 10 regions. In the first period (2001-2004), ten regions concentrate 
a share of overall EU patents nearly double compared to GDP. Looking at the 
concentration among the leading regions, the centrifugal effect appears more 
marked for the technological development than GDP. Indeed, the share of patent of 
the top 10 regions decreases consistently (from 35.4% to 29.9%), while the share 
of GDP has even slightly increased over the 2001-2016 period. 
 
Table 1: Technological and GDP concentration in the EU 
Gini coefficients across NUTS2 EU regions and shares of top 10 regions  
 2001-2004 2005-2008 2009-2012 2013-2016 
Gini coefficients     
GDP 0.51 0.49 0.49 0.49 
Patents 0.72 0.70 0.69 0.68 
     Patents by technology area:     
     Chemistry 0.71 0.71 0.69 0.68 
     ICT & electrical engineering 0.79 0.76 0.75 0.74 
     Instruments 0.72 0.71 0.70 0.71 
     Mechanical engineering 0.72 0.72 0.70 0.69 
     Other technologies 0.65 0.67 0.66 0.66 
Share of patents and GDP of top 10 EU 
regions 
    
Patents 35.4% 32.6% 31.0% 29.9% 
GDP 18.9% 18.9% 19.3% 19.1% 
Note: for some countries (CY, EE, LT, LU, LV, MT) NUTS2 level data are not available, for 
these countries NUTS1 figures are used. Source: Authors’ computations on Regpat 2019a 
and Eurostat data. 
 
Table 2 shows the levels and dynamics of the shares of EU patents and R&D 
expenditures by country groups, indicating that the bulk of patented inventions in 
the EU and resources devoted to R&D are generated in the Central Europe. 
Regions in the East Europe have more than doubled their share of patents and 
R&D. However, in the most recent period they still account for 3.1% of patents (in 
2013-16) and 4% of R&D (in 2017-19) only. Patents are a capitalist institution that 
was rather meaningless in the former planned economies, but the fact that after 
three decades since the beginning of the transition to a market economy Eastern 
European countries have not generated a significant number of patents suggest that 
their inventive activities is still low. The share of patents and R&D expenditures of 
Southern regions has been decreasing in the last two periods, probably as a result 
of the particular heavy and long-lasting effects of the 2008 economic crisis. 
 
 
Table 2: Shares of EU patents and R&D by country 
groups         
 Shares of Patents  Shares of R&D expenditure 
  2001-04 2005-08 2009-12 2013-16   2001-04 2005-08 2009-12 2013-16 2017-19 
           
North EU 8.8% 9.2% 9.8% 9.8%  12.3% 12.2% 12.4% 11.9% 11.4% 
Central EU 79.7% 77.8% 77.1% 76.2%  72.9% 70.2% 69.3% 71.0% 70.9% 
South EU 10.1% 11.2% 10.6% 10.8%  12.7% 14.7% 14.7% 13.1% 13.0% 
East EU 1.3% 1.8% 2.5% 3.1%  2.2% 2.9% 3.6% 4.0% 4.8% 
Total EU 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%   100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Source: Authors’ elaborations on Regpat and Eurostat data       
 
Table 3 provides a breakdown of technological concentration in Europe presenting 
Gini coefficient indexes over the 4 sub periods for each of the 35 WIPO 
technological fields. There are significant differences across technological fields in 
the spatial distribution of innovative capabilities across EU regions.  
 
 
Table 3: Technological concentration in the EU by technology fields 
Gini coefficients across NUTS2 EU regions 
 
Note: for some countries (CY, EE, LT, LU, LV, MT) NUTS2 level data are not available, for these 
countries NUTS1 figures are used. Source: authors’ computations on Regpat 2019a data. 
 
Table 3 confirms that the most polarized technological fields are related to ICT and 
digital technologies (Semiconductors, Basic communications, Digital 
communications, Audio-visual, Telecommunications). Among the least unequal 
technological fields we find the Pharmaceutical and Bio-technology areas 
(Pharmaceutical, Bio-materials, Bio-technologies and Medical technologies). 
The already mentioned process of spatial re-balancing of technological capacities 
is a rather widespread phenomenon across the technological fields. In fact, in the 
2001-2016 period, the level of technological polarization has decreased in most of 
the technological fields. The long-run decrease of technological concentration is 
particularly significant in the technological fields where the spatial distribution of 
technological capacities is more uneven.   
 
Technological gaps and catching-up processes in the EU. A 
regional analysis 
The rationale for examining the spatial distribution of technological activities in 
the EU at the regional level is based upon the hypothesis that science, technology 
and innovation are phenomena that take place in defined structural and institutional 
contexts, and are affected by factors that operate not only within a national system 
of innovation but also at a subnational level. Concepts such as “regional” or even 
“local” systems of innovation reflect such a perspective and there is a large 
empirical evidence supporting such a view (Howells, 1999; Evangelista et al., 2002; 
Asheim and Gertler, 2005; Iammarino, 2005). This perspective should not be seen 
as clashing with the fundamental fact that regional and local innovation systems 
are part of, and are institutionally and functionally embedded in, broader national 
science and technology systems. Moving further this line of reasoning, regional 
disparities might also be related to broader economic and geopolitical contexts, 
reflecting the heterogeneous historical roots and development patterns 
characterizing the different EU macro-regional areas. 
Some hints on the relative importance or “pure regional factors” in explaining the 
observed spatial technological disparities in the EU – vis-à-vis the role played by 
drivers and factors acting at national or macroregional level – can be obtained by 
performing an analysis of variance (ANOVA) using two key indicators for the 
regional technological and economic performances: the number of patents and the 
level of GDP both normalized by the population. With the ANOVA is possible to 
disentangle the part of cross-regional variance in technological and economic 
performances accounted by differences in the strength of national or macro-
regional economic and innovation systems where regions are located; the residual 
variance is therefore associated to differences in the regional innovation contexts.  
Table 4 shows the results of ANOVA analyses carried on the four sub-periods 
considered in this study. The results confirm the importance played by both 
country and macro-regional specific factors in explaining the existing spatial 
technological and economic asymmetries within the EU area. “Country 
specificities” account for about 50% of the variance of both patent and GDP per 
capita at regional level with the remaining 50% of variance “explained” by 
differences in the technological strength of regions; a basic result that confirms the 
relevance of both the national and of the regional components in generating a 
successful innovation system. Furthermore, when considering patents per capita, 
the relative importance of these two components has not changed much over the 
2001-16 period.  
Differently, the “explanatory” power of the country context on GDP per capita has 
steadily decreased during the period considered, with regional idiosyncrasies 
becoming more relevant, somehow mirroring the increasing importance of regions 
in the EU policy.  The results presented in Table 4 justifies the regional scope of 
this study but at the same time the need of recognising that a large part of regional 
technological gaps in Europe, as well as their dynamics, have to do with strong 
country differences within the EU in the quality and strength of the production and 
science & technology systems.  
 
Table 4: Technological capabilities and GDP per capita at regional level. How 
much countries matter?  
Analysis of variance 
  2001-2004 2005-2008 2009-2012 2013-2016 
ANOVA: country R-squared 
Patent per capita 0.470 0.504 0.525 0.498 
GDP per capita 0.557 0.498 0.498 0.474 
Source: Authors’ elaborations on Regpat and Eurostat data 
 
The importance of regional and country specific factors in explaining technological 
asymmetries in the EU surfaces looking at Map 1, reporting the level of patent 
intensity (number of patents per capita) of EU NUTS2 regions in 2001-04 and 2013-
16. The maps show both strong macro-regional differences in the patent intensity and 
a certain degree of technological inhomogeneity within most EU countries. The 
highest levels of patents per capita are found in the North and Central Europe but this 
area also extends to the North of Italy, while a more uneven regional pattern is found 
in France. The least innovative regions are in the Eastern and Southern Europe.  
 





Note: Regions are split in five equally populated groups (quintiles, 20%) on the base of 
patent per capita. Source: Authors’ computations on Regpat 2019a and H2020 data. 
A comparison of the two maps show a high degree of stability of the EU 
technological landscape with the persistence of very large gaps between the lowest 
and highest performing macro-regional areas of EU: in synthesis, not much has 
changed between 2001 and 2016 in the EU spatial technological landscape, with Map 






Map 2: Patent per capita growth  
 
Note: Regions are split in five equally populated groups (quintiles, 20%) on the base of 
patent per capita growth comparing the 2001-2004 with the 2013-2016 period. Source: 
Authors’ computations on Regpat 2019a and H2020 data. 
 
However, a less static picture emerges when we look specifically at the rates of 
change over the 15 years considered. Map 2, reporting the rates of growth of the 
patent per capita index between the first and the last period, shows the presence of a 
catching up process in many traditionally backward regions. This is particularly the 
case of most East European regions as a result of a rapid integration of these regions 
into the capitalist intellectual property rights system and in the Central EU (Germany 
centred) production system. The apparently contrasting messages emerging from 
Maps 1 and 2 can be reconciled looking at Figure 1 showing the level and dynamics 
of the patent per capita index for the main EU macro-regional blocks. The figure 
shows the very low initial patent intensity of Eastern regions, which are closing the 
gap with Southern ones. The figure also confirms that regions in the North Europe 
and Nordic countries continue to be the technological core and engine of the EU.  
 
 
Figure 1: Patent per capita across country group 
Average patent per capita (weighted by population) 
 
Source: Authors’ computations on Regpat 2019a and H2020 data. 
 
 
Technological polarization in the EU: a role for Horizon 2020? 
 
To what extent could a policy instrument such as Horizon 2020 modify the regional 
distribution of regional technological capabilities, enlarging or contributing to closing 
the technological gaps shown in the previous section? Indeed, H2020 could act as a 
policy scheme favouring or mitigating technological polarization within the EU. 
While it is too early to directly assess the impact of H2020 on the technological 
trajectories of EU regions, in this section we will derive indirect evidence on this 
topic using data on the regional access to such program, and to some of its main 
funding schemes. In fact, H2020 is organized around different pillars and objectives, 
mapping into actions (the actual funding schemes) that are governed by specific rules, 
and that may have a differentiated distributional effect on EU organizations and the 
territories hosting them. Accordingly, In the next subsection, we describe the main 
features of the key actions of H2020, each one supporting different actors and phases 
of the research and innovation process and characterized by different potential effects 
on technological convergence and divergence in the EU; this will be functional to 
interpreting the macro-regional distribution of the different H2020 in the EU  context 
and the results of the regression analysis aiming at shedding some light on the 
potential role played by the H2020 Programme in exacerbating or mitigating 
technological polarization within the EU. 
 
The characteristics and logic of different H2020 funding schemes 
Table 5 summarizes the main features of the four key funding schemes of H2020: the 
European Research Council (ERC), the Marie Skłodowska-Curie Actions (MSCA) 
the Research & innovation actions (RIA) and the Innovation actions (IA). All together 
these four actions account for about 80% of the total H2020 budget, almost 30% are 
channelled through the first two actions and more than 50% through RIA and IA 
actions.  
 
The European Research Council is a relatively recent body within the EU research 
and innovation panorama. Established in 2007 with the FP7 (the 2007-2014 funding 
period), it was the first scheme allowing the support of research projects by single 
researchers or teams (European Commission, 2007) and for the first time we explore 
its impact at the regional level. Indeed, up to the FP7, collaboration among 
researchers/teams was the main purpose of the European Research and Innovation 
funds, with the idea of creating an integrated research space in the EU. The FP7 
introduced the idea of scientific excellence and, under the H2020, the ERC was 
entitled with a budget of 13€ billion – about 18.7% of the overall budget - to foster 
frontier research within the pillar “Excellent Science”, which was not bound any 
more to the purpose of cohesion which, for other FP activities, implied also to 
generate collaborations in the same research projects across central and peripheral 
EU areas. The idea of excellence was translated in an evaluation of the programme 
based on the share of publications from ERC funded projects among the top 1% 
highly cited (European Commission, 2011b).   
 
 
Table 5: An overview of the main H2020 actions 
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or designs for new, 
altered or improved 
products, processes or 
services. 
Research 
Development                                        
Pre-production 
(17.9%) 
Note: we report the actual shares only for ERC and MSCA, because for these funding schemes the 
correspondence between H2020 budget and structure is straightforward (see 
https://ec.europa.eu/research/participants/docs/h2020-funding-guide/grants/applying-for-funding/find-a-
call/h2020-structure-and-budget_en.htm#SO_widen). We check for consistency comparing budget figures with 
allocation of funds across EU regions as reported in our sample. The 4 funding schemes reported in the table 
cover more than 80% of the in sample H2020 budget.  
 
It is reasonable to expect that the emphasis on excellence of the ERC may render 
particularly difficult accessing these funds for regions less endowed of knowledge 
capabilities, while the lack of a collaborative design may also hinder the inclusion of 
and the diffusion of knowledge toward lagging regions. Therefore, the funding 
scheme is likely to be the least aligned to the goals of cohesion policies. 
Also the MSCA operates under the pillar of “Excellence Science” to distribute highly 
competitive and prestigious research and innovation awards allowing for career 
development and further training of researchers at all career stages through mobility 
to a hosting institution. The probability for a university to host MSCA grantees 
significantly increases in relation to its research performance and international 
orientation, despite some top universities have so far hosted fewer grantees than 
expected (Falk and Hagsten, 2020). Moreover, the MSCA sustains the diffusion of 
knowledge toward a series of programmes supporting research networks, staff 
exchange, and the promotion of research results to the public. Similarly to the ERC, 
we can expect that the excellence goal of this policy scheme may favour better 
endowed regions; however, the collaborative setting of some parts of this fund and the 
declared objective of favouring knowledge diffusion may soften its possible 
contribution to knowledge polarization. 
 
Finally, the RIA and IA support basic and applied research to foster the development 
of new knowledge addressing the so-called societal challenges with the former 
slightly more oriented toward the earliest phases of the research and development 
process.4 However, for the evaluation of both types of actions patents were conceived 
as a (the) key performance indicator (European Commission, 2011), reflecting a 
possible bias toward technological innovation in the policy design.  
 
While the ERC and MSCA strongly stress the concept of scientific excellence, the 
RIA and IA actions are competitive funds reflecting the original collaborative logic of 
the Framework Programmes. From the one hand, we should expect that the 
competitive logic of this funds is reflected in a higher capability of more endowed 
regions to access them. From the other hand, the collaborative logic aiming at 
integrating more peripherical regions to develop an integrated research area may act 
as a counterweight. Therefore, their role of RIA and IA in contributing or mitigating 
knowledge polarization is ex-ante more ambiguous. 
 
To have a first glimpse of the role played by the H2020 and its main 4 funding 
schemes, we present in Table 6 the budget allocation of H2020 funds across the main 
EU country groups during the period 2015-19. The table provides a first indication of 
the possible role of such programmes with respect to the existing technological 
asymmetries (proxied by the shares of patents reported in the last column).  
 
The distribution of H2020 budget across country groups does not match closely that 
of patents.  Southern and Eastern EU countries receive a share of H2020 budget that is 
about twice than that of patents. In other words, these areas have access to a higher 
share of funds than those we would expect assuming that the competitive logic leads 
to a distribution of funds proportional to the regional knowledge capabilities. 
 
Table 6: Shares of the H2020 budget and patents by country group 
Group H2020 ERC MCSA RIA IA Patents 
North EU 9.1% 8.7% 9.9% 8.2% 8.9% 9.8% 
Central EU 60.6% 74.1% 60.5% 60.5% 54.9% 76.2% 
South EU 23.3% 13.8% 21.7% 25.1% 29.7% 10.8% 
East EU 7.0% 3.4% 7.7% 6.0% 6.5% 3.1% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100.0% 
 
4 The H2020 is based on a challenge-based approach to bring together resources and knowledge 
across different fields, technologies and disciplines. 
Note: H2020 funds refer to budget allocated between 2015 and 2019, for comparison 
purposes we also report the share of patents during the 2013-2016 (as in the last 
column of table 2).  
Source: Authors’ computations on Regpat 2019a and H2020 data. 
 
Among the specific actions, the ERC is the only one that tends to replicate the 
technological asymmetries of European areas discussed above. In the regression 
analysis we will explore these relationships exploiting the regional level information. 
 
Regional technological capabilities and access to H2020 funds. An econometric 
analysis 
As we said, the descriptive statistics reported in Table 6 provide only first insights 
regarding the potential role played by the H2020 in reducing the level of 
technological asymmetries in the EU. In this section we try to assess such a role in a 
multivariate regression framework using the following specification:  
 
 (1) 
where  indicates a generic NUTS2 EU region. In other words, we estimate the 
logarithmic relationship between the H2020 funds received by a region and its 
technological capabilities observed before the starting of the H2020. Once assessed 
the relationship for the overall H2020, we explore possible specificities across the 
different funding schemes presented in the previous section. 
We use a log-log specification to directly estimate the elasticity - the relationship 
between the percentage changes - of H2020 with respect to patents. Where the 
estimated  is equal to 1, then a 1% increase in the technological capabilities of a 
region is reflected in the same increase of H2020 funds. With  the H2020 
would increase more than patents, (over)prizing regions endowed with more 
technological capabilities, thus pointing to a possible polarizing effect; for  the 
H2020 would instead show an equalizing effect of this policy programme, with higher 
technological capabilities matched by less than proportional increases of funds. 
We enrich the basic specification with a series of controls to account for possibly 
confounding factors and correctly identify the relationship at stake. As we saw, 
country specificities matter in determining technological differences within the EU 
regions. We therefore include a list of dummy variables to control for country specific 
fixed effects. Moreover, we cluster the standard errors at the country level to account 
for the fact that regions from the same country cannot be considered as independent 
observations; errors are likely to be correlated for regions belonging to the same 
country. In this way we control for possible differences in the strength and quality of 
the national innovation systems in which regions are embedded, and that can have a 
role in determining the capacity of regions to access H2020 funds beside their pure 
technological capabilities. Once controlling for the fact that observations are clustered 
within countries, we are quite confident that the country fixed effects will reflect – at 
least to some extent - the “integration-collaborative logic” guiding most of the EU 
funding schemes.  
To try to partial out the effects of regional characteristics not directly related to 
technological capabilities, we also include the logarithm of the regional GDP per 
capita to capture those factors contributing to the strength of the regional system 
beyond strict technological capabilities, such as the strength of the scientific 
infrastructure as well as the organizational capabilities or soft types of innovation, 
making them more resilient (Filippetti et al., 2020). Finally, we also include a dummy 
variable for capital regions to capture the fact that in many countries’ capital regions 
outperform other areas from a scientific and innovative viewpoint (Paunov et al., 
2019) and have been among the areas driving regional competitiveness in the EU 
(European Commission, 2017). The strong presence in these regions of public 
services and most national higher-level knowledge-based functions (Mayer et al., 
2017) could again represent an important comparative advantage in the participation 
to EU S&T competitive policy schemes and more specifically to the access to H2020 
funds. 
For each region Patents and GDP per capita are averaged over the five years (2010-
14) preceding the beginning of allocation of the H2020 funds (2015-19). We first run 
our set of regressions on the overall H2020 funds accessed by EU regions, and then 
test the full specification on the specific sub h2020 policy schemes (ERC, MSCA, 
RIA and IA) to explore possible specificities of the relationship between 
technological capabilities and access to funds.  
Regression results 
In Table 7 we report the results of our least square estimations. In the first column we 
report the estimation of equation 1, excluding the control variables (GDP per capita, 
capital region and country dummies). The coefficient attached to  is in this 
case significantly smaller than 1 (see also the results of the test reported in the middle 
of the table). This suggests that the capacity of regions to accessing H2020 increases 
less than proportionally with respect their technological capability, a result consistent 
with the descriptive statistics presented in Table 6 (section 6.1). However, this result 
also suggests that the H2020 “overprize” regions less endowed from a technological 
point of view, which would be contrary to the competitive logic of the program.  
When including the country fixed effects,  turns out to be not statistically different 
from 1, a result more consistent with the idea that the EU distributes competitive 
research and innovation funds proportional to the knowledge capabilities of each EU 
region. The result holds true also when adding the GDP per capita which seems to 
have a positive effect on the capacity to access H2020 funds. Interestingly, when we 
control also for capital regions, the coefficient attached to GDP per capita is not 
statistically significant anymore. This implies that Capital regions have more 
“explanatory power” than (and capture the variance explained by) the overall quality 
of the regional production and innovation system proxied by the GDP per capital 
indicator; the presence of a critical mass of S&T and public infrastructures in regions 
hosting large capital urban areas may be among the reasons explaining this finding. 
 
Table 7 – H2020 funds at regional level, OLS estimations 
Dependent variable: Log of funds allocated 2015-2019 (versus 2010-2014 variables) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Patents (log) 0.690*** 1.060*** 0.970*** 0.946*** 
 (0.0951) (0.0580) (0.0620) (0.0593) 
GDP per capita (log)   0.760** 0.308 
   (0.351) (0.354) 
Capital region    0.950*** 
    (0.231) 
Country Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 13.64*** 11.50*** 9.647*** 11.11*** 
 (0.605) (0.337) (0.963) (1.015) 
Test beta patents = 1 0.003*** 0.314 0.629 0.367 
Observations 259 259 259 259 
R-squared 0.525 0.740 0.750 0.763 
F-stat 248.8 334 191.1 194.6 
RMSE 1.189 0.927 0.912 0.889 
Note: Standard errors clustered at country level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1. In there out of four specifications the t-tests does not reject the 
hypothesis of unitary elasticity of H2020 funds versus innovation capabilities of a 
region. 
 
How to reconcile the unitary elasticity of H2020 funds to patents with the fact that the 
former seem to be less concentrated than the latter, favouring regions from Eastern 
and Southern countries (as shown in table 6)? The response to this question can be 
provided looking at the country fixed effects reported in Figure 2. The figure seems to 
confirm the presence of a rebalancing rational of H2020 with respect to the existing 
macro-regional technological asymmetries shown in previous sections. In fact, the 
figure shows that once controlling for their technological capabilities, regions in 
Nordic and Western countries tend to receive, on average, lower amounts of H2020 
funds than regions located in Southern and Eastern countries. In particular, regions 
from Germany and France receive about 5% funds less with respect to the sample 
average. On the contrary, regions located in countries listed on the right part of the 
figure receive up to 10% or more than the sample average.  
 
 
Figure 2: Country fixed from the estimation reported in Table 7 (col. 4)  
 
Note: Country fixed effects from column 4 of table 7 are normalized by the 
sample average, they can be read as percentage national “premia” (or re-
balancing mechanism) once accounting for technological and other capabilities.  
 
All-in-all these results suggest that, while respecting a competitive (technologically 
based) logic, the H2020 funds have been able to not let behind regions located in least 
technological advanced countries. The objective to create an integrate research area 
through a collaborative design of the funding scheme may have helped balancing the 
distribution of funds, prevailing on the possible polarizing effect deriving from the 
existing asymmetries in the strength of the national innovation systems in which 
regions are embedded.  
 
We have nonetheless argued that the different H2020 actions, given their different 
rational and targets, could differ in terms of their potential “polarizing” or “balancing” 
effects on the EU technological landscape. In order to explore this issue, we have 
replicated the estimation of equation 1 for the four H2020 main policy schemes (ERC, 
MSCA, RIA, IA). The results of these estimates are presented in table 8. The results, 
and in particular the different values of the beta coefficient, confirm the presence of 
differentiated effects of the four policy schemes. 
 
For the two schemes operating under the scientific excellence pillar the coefficient 
attached to patents is statistically greater than 1. For ERC, the coefficient is 
particularly large, suggesting that an increase of the regional technological 
capabilities is matched by a threefold increase of funds’ availability. It is also worth 
noticing that the coefficient attached the capital cities is much large for the regression 
on ERC than for the other funds, suggesting that the focus on excellence may 
particularly favour capital urban areas. For the RIA and IA, the results are in line with 
the main regressions.5 
 
5 An inspection of the country fixed effects, not reported for reasons of space, reveals that for RIA and 
IA these match closely those reported in figure 2. Differently, the country fixed effects for ERC and 
MSCA does not show clear patterns. Finally, we should also point out that the number of regions 
accessing ERC funds in our sample is much lower than that accessing the other funds considered, 
further reinforcing the idea of a concentration of funds in the most technologically endowed regions. 
 
Table 8 – Main H2020 actions allocation at regional level, OLS estimations 
Dependent variable: Log of funds allocated 2015-2019 (versus 2010-2014 variables) 
  ERC MSCA RIA IA 
Patents (log) 3.572*** 1.613*** 1.109*** 0.944*** 
 (0.300) (0.219) (0.170) (0.126) 
GDP per capita (log) -1.498 -0.929 0.563 0.582 
 (1.715) (1.062) (0.434) (0.413) 
Capital region 3.629*** 1.578** 0.917** 0.785*** 
 (1.207) (0.671) (0.388) (0.268) 
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -5.110 7.924** 8.194*** 8.432*** 
 (4.814) (3.296) (1.849) (1.469) 
Test beta patents = 1 0.000*** 0.0097*** 0.529 0.658 
Observations 259 259 259 259 
Adj. R-squared 0.501 0.333 0.563 0.518 
RMSE 5.461 3.262 1.761 1.659 
Note: Standard errors clustered at country level in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1.       The t-tests strongly reject the hypothesis of unitary elasticity for 
the ERC and MSCA actions.  
 
The inspection of the H2020-patent relationship across different funding schemes  
therefore provide evidence of a possible heterogeneous role of the different EU 
research and innovation schemes, and in particular of the main H2020 actions, with 
respect to regional convergence/polarization. Indeed, policy schemes aiming at 
prizing excellences (as in the case of the ERC action) seem to exacerbate the 
differences in the knowledge capabilities of regions and possibly contribute to the 
process of polarization between European regions. 
 
Conclusions and policy implications: EU S&T policy and regional 
capabilities 
 
The paper has confirmed that regional unbalances in technological capabilities in the 
EU are very severe. While some timid signs of convergence have occurred, the 
contribution of regions to the overall generation of new knowledge is very 
asymmetric. Eastern European countries, despite the attempt to be better integrated 
into the overall EU scientific and technological communities, have done small 
progresses in enhancing their own innovative capacity, indicating that the transition 
from planned to market economy, at least from a technological point of view, has 
been harder than expected. Southern European regions continue to be far away from 
the Northern Europeans and have accumulated delay in the aftermath of the 2008 
crisis.  
 
The empirical analysis we carried out using ANOVA has confirmed that these 
differences are due to both regional-specific and national-specific factors. This ratifies 
the view that it is important to act on both regional and national systems to upgrade 
the competences of specific geographical areas.  
 
The major effort to reverse the inertial trend can be associated to both national and 
EU policies. In this paper we have assessed one policy instrument only, the H2020, in 
the hands of the EU, and not the effectiveness of national and local policies. We have 
also highlighted that the financial resources available under H2020 are rather small 
compared to the herculean objective of building a cohesive Europe, although its 
funding have a much greater strategic importance since it is project-specific and it is 
associated to a demanding evaluation process.  
 
We have also argued that H2020 has a sort of impossible mission: on the one hand, it 
should foster the EU technological capabilities and areas of excellence vis-à-vis a 
fierce global competition with established nations such as the United States and 
Japan, and with emerging nations such as China and India. On the other hand, it 
should also increase EU cohesion by reducing technological disparities across its 
regions. The two objectives are somehow in conflict since the first may require a 
further agglomeration of competences in the already strongest areas to compete with 
Silicon Valley, Route 128, Toyota, Samsung town or Shenzhen, the second to nurture 
capabilities in the least developed regions. 
 
It is true that H2020 it is one of the world largest public schemes supporting the 
development of new knowledge. But the yearly funds available through H2020 are 
comparable to what one of the top corporations spends in a year: while the year 
budget of H2020 is about 11 billion euros, large corporations such as Samsung (12.6 
billion euros), Alphabet (12.5), Volkswagen (12.2), Microsoft (11.5) or Huawei (10.5) 
alone spend more or comparable amounts. 
 
Our analysis suggests that H2020 has not managed, nor it could manage, to reverse 
the natural propensity towards the agglomeration of knowledge intensive activities 
carried out that occur in any customs union. But it has at least helped to contain a 
further increase in the gap, and it has sent a clear message to policy makers of the 
least developed regions: any attempt to enhance their own national capacity through 
endogenous effort would have found in the EC a constructive partner. 
 
Our assessment suggests that, despite these difficulties, H2020 has supported 
activities in the areas of excellence, especially through the ERC, it has also managed 
to provide resources to the laggard regions, allowing them, especially thorough the IA 
e RIA pillars, to support their integration with the innovation systems of the strongest 
regions. 
 
On the grounds of this evidence, we welcome the fact that the next Recovery Fund, 
which will imply that resources, including those devoted to science, technology and 
innovation, will be distributed and granted by national authorities, has not been 
funded by downsizing the next Framework Programme 2021-27, Horizon Europe. 
Still, we wonder if the resources available will be sufficient to satisfy the two main 
goals of fostering EU excellence in innovation and to help cohesion in science and 
technology. The fact that, in the past, the instrument has shown a certain efficacy in 
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